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Abstract
Orthodox Copenhagen quantum theory renounces the quest to un-
derstand the reality in which we are imbedded, and settles for prac-
tical rules that describe connections between our observations. Many
physicist have believed that this renunciation of the attempt describe
nature herself was premature, and John von Neumann, in a major
work, reformulated quantum theory as theory of the evolving objec-
tive universe. In the course of his work he converted to a benefit what
had appeared to be a severe deficiency of the Copenhagen interpre-
tation, namely its introduction into physical theory of the human ob-
servers. He used this subjective element of quantum theory to achieve
a significant advance on the main problem in philosophy, which is to
understand the relationship between mind and matter. That problem
had been tied closely to physical theory by the works of Newton and
Descartes. The present work examines the major problems that have
appeared to block the development of von Neumann’s theory into a
fully satisfactory theory of Nature, and proposes solutions to these
problems.
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The Nonlocality Controversy
“Nonlocality gets more real”. This is the provocative title of a recent
report in Physics Today [1]. Three experiments are cited. All three confirm to
high accuracy the predictions of quantum theory in experiments that suggest
the occurrence of an instantaneous action over a large distance. The most
spectacular of the three experiments begins with the production of pairs
of photons in a lab in downtown Geneva. For some of these pairs, one
member is sent by optical fiber to the village of Bellevue, while the other
is sent to the town of Bernex. The two towns lie more than 10 kilometers
apart. Experiments on the arriving photons are performed in both villages at
essentially the same time. What is found is this: The observed connections
between the outcomes of these experiments defy explanation in terms of
ordinary ideas about the nature of the physical world on the scale of directly
observable objects. This conclusion is announced in opening sentence of the
Physical-Review-Letters report [2] that describes the experiment: “Quantum
theory is nonlocal”.
This observed effect is not just an academic matter. A possible appli-
cation of interest to the Swiss is this: The effect can be used in principle
to transfer banking records over large distances in a secure way [3]. But
of far greater importance to physicists is its relevance to two fundamental
questions: What is the nature of physical reality? What is the form of basic
physical theory?
The answers to these questions depend crucially on the nature of physical
causation. Isaac Newton erected his theory of gravity on the idea of instant
action at a distance. According to Newton’s theory, if a person were to
suddenly kick a stone, and send it flying off in some direction, every particle
in the entire universe would immediately begin to feel the effect of that kick.
Thus, in Newton’s theory, every part of the universe is instantly linked,
causally, to every other part. To even think about such an instantaneous
action one needs the idea of the instant of time “now”, and a sequence of
such instants each extending over the entire universe.
1
This idea that what a person does in one place could act instantly affect
physical reality in a faraway place is a mind-boggling notion, and it was
banished from classical physics by Einstein’s theory of relativity. But the
idea resurfaced at the quantum level in the debate between Einstein and
Bohr. Einstein objected to the “mysterious action at a distance”, which
quantum theory seemed to entail, but Bohr defended “the necessity of a final
renunciation of the classical ideal of causality and a radical revision of our
attitude towards the problem of physical reality”[4].
The essence of this radical revision was explained by Dirac at the 1927
Solvay conference [5]. He insisted on the restriction of the application of
quantum theory to our knowledge of a system, rather than to the system
itself. Thus physical theory became converted from a theory about ‘physically
reality’, as it had formerly been understood, into a theory about human
knowledge.
This view is encapsulated in Heisenberg’s famous statement [6]:
“The conception of the objective reality of the elementary particles has
thus evaporated not into the cloud of some obscure new reality concept, but
into the transparent clarity of a mathematics that represents no longer the
behaviour of the particle but rather our knowledge of this behaviour.”
This conception of quantum theory, espoused by Bohr, Dirac, and Heisen-
berg, is called the Copenhagen interpretation. It is essentially subjective and
epistemological, because the basic reality of the theory is ‘our knowledge’.
It is certainly true that science rests ultimately on what we know. That
fact is the basis of the new point of view. However, the tremendous suc-
cesses of the classical physical theory inaugurated by Galileo, Descartes, and
Newton during the seventeenth century, had raised the hope and expectation
that human beings could extract from careful observation, and the imagina-
tive creation of testable hypotheses, a valid idea of the general nature and
rules of behaviour of the reality in which our human knowledge is imbedded.
Giving up on that hope is indeed a radical shift. On the other hand, classi-
cal physical theory left part of reality out, namely our conscious experiences.
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Hence it had no way to account either for the existence of our conscious expe-
riences or for how knowledge can reside in those experiences. Thus bringing
human experience into our understanding of reality seems to be a step in the
right direction. It might allow science to explain, eventually, how we know
what we know. But Copenhagen quantum theory is only a half-way house:
it brings in human experience, but at the stiff price of excluding the rest of
reality.
Yet how could the renowned scientists who created Copenhagen quantum
theory ever believe, and sway most other physicists into believing, that a
complete science could leave out the physical world? It is undeniable that
we can never know for sure that a proposed theory of the world around us
is really true. But that is not a sufficient reason to renounce, as a matter
of principle, the attempt to form at least a coherent idea of what the world
could be like, and rules by which it could work. Clearly some extraordinarily
powerful consideration was in play.
That powerful consideration was a basic idea about the nature of phys-
ical causation that had been injected into physics by Einstein’s theory of
relativity. That idea was not working!
The problem is this. Quantum theory often entails that an act of acquir-
ing knowledge in one place instantly changes the theoretical representation
of some faraway system. Physicists were—and are—reluctant to believe that
performing a nearby act can instantly change a faraway physical reality. How-
ever, they recognize that “our knowledge” of a faraway system can instantly
change when we learn something about a nearby system. In particular, if
certain properties of two systems are known to be strongly correlated, then
finding out something about one system can tell us something about the
other. For example, if we know that two particles start from some known
point at the same time, and then move away from that point at the same
speeds, but in opposite directions, then finding one of these particles at a
certain point allows us to ‘know’ where the other particle lies at that same
instant: it must lie at the same distance from the starting point as the ob-
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served particle, but in the opposite direction. In this simple case we do not
think that the act of observing the position of one particle causes the other
particle to be where it is. We realize that it is only our knowledge of the
faraway system that has changed. This analogy allows us resolve, by fiat,
any mystery about an instantaneous faraway effect of a nearby act: if some-
thing faraway can instantly be altered by a nearby act then it must be our
knowledge. But then the analog in quantum theory of the physical reality of
classical physical theory must be our knowledge.
This way of dodging the action-at-a-distance problem was challenged by
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen in a famous paper [7] entitled: “Can quantum-
mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?” The
issue was whether a theory that is specified to be merely a set of rules about
connections between human experiences can be considered to be a complete
description of physical reality. Einstein and his colleagues gave a reasonable
definition of “physical reality”, and then argued, directly from some basic
precepts of quantum theory itself, that the answer to this question is ‘No’.
Bohr [8] disagreed.
Given the enormity of what must exist in the universe as a whole, and
the relative smallness human knowledge, it is astonishing that, in the minds
of most physicists, Bohr prevailed over Einstein in this debate: the major-
ity of quantum physicists acquiesced to Bohr’s claim that quantum theory,
regarded as a theory about human knowledge, is a complete description of
physical reality. This majority opinion stems, I believe, more from the lack of
a promising alternative candidate than from any decisive logical argument.
Einstein, commenting on the orthodox Copenhagen position, said: “What
I dislike about this kind of argument is the basic positivistic attitude, which
from my view is untenable, and seems to me to come to the same thing as
Berkeley’s principle [9], esse est percipi, “to be is to be perceived”. Sev-
eral other scientists also reject the majority opinion. For example, Murray
Gell-Mann [10] asserts: “Niels Bohr brainwashed a whole generation into
believing that the problem was solved fifty years ago”. Gell-mann believes
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that in order to integrate quantum theory coherently into cosmology, and to
understand the evolutionary process that has produced creatures that can
have knowledge, one needs to have a coherent theory of the evolving quantum
mechanical reality in which these creatures are imbedded.
It is in the context of such efforts to construct a more complete theory
that the significance of the experiments pertaining to quantum nonlocality
lies.
The point is this: If nature really is nonlocal, as these experiments sug-
gest, then the way is open to the development of a rationally coherent theory
of nature that integrates the subjective knowings introduced by Copenhagen
quantum theory into an objectively existing and evolving physical reality.
The basic framework is provided by the version of quantum theory con-
structed by John von Neumann [11]
All physical theories are, of course, provisional, and subject to future re-
vision and elaboration. But at a given stage in the development of science
the contending theories can be evaluated on many grounds, such as utility,
parsimony, predictive power, explanatory power, conceptual simplicity, log-
ical coherence, and aesthetic beauty. The development of von Neumann’s
theory that I shall describe here fares well on all of these counts.
To understand von Neumann’s improvement one must appreciate the
problems with its predecessor. Copenhagen quantum theory gives special
status to measuring devices. These devices are physical systems: they are
made up of atomic constituents. But in spite of this, these devices are ex-
cluded from the world of atomic constituents that are described in the math-
ematical language of quantum theory. The measuring devices, are described,
instead, in a different language, namely by “the same means of communi-
cation as the one used in classical physics” [12]. This approach renders the
theory pragmatically useful but physically incoherent. It links the theory to
“our knowledge” of the measuring devices in a useful way, but disrupts the
dynamical unity of the physical world by treating in different ways different
atomic particles that are interacting with each other. This tearing apart of
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the physical world creates huge conceptual problems, which are ducked in
the Copenhagen approach by renouncing man’s ability to understand reality.
The Copenhagen version of quantum theory is thus a hybrid of the old
familiar classical theory, which physicists were understandably reluctant to
abandon completely, and a totally new theory based on radically different
concepts. The old ideas, concepts, and language were used to describe our
experiences, but the old idea that the visible objects were made up of tiny
material objects resembling miniature planets, or minute rocks, was dropped.
The observed physical world is described rather by a mathematical structure
that can best be characterized as representing information and propensities:
the information is about certain events that have occurred in the past, and
the propensities are objective tendencies pertaining to future events.
These “events” are the focal point of quantum theory: they are hap-
penings that in the Copenhagen approach are ambiguously associated both
with the “measuring devices” and with increments in the knowledge of the
observers who are examining these devices. Each increment of knowledge is
an event that updates the knowledge of the observers by bringing it in line
with the observed outcome of an event occurring at a device. The agreement
between the event at the device and the event in the mind of the observer is
to be understood in the same way as it is understood in classical physics.
But there’s the rub: the connection between human knowledge and the
physical world never has been understood in classical physics. The seven-
teenth century division between mind and matter upon which classical phys-
ically theory was erected was such a perfect cleavage that no reconciliation
has ever been achieved, in spite of tremendous efforts. Nor is such a reconcil-
iation possible within classical physics. According to that theory, the world
of matter is built out of microscopic entities whose behaviours are fixed by
interaction with their immediate neighbors. Nothing need exist except what
can be deduced, by using only the precepts of classical physical theory, from
the existence of these microscopic building blocks. But the defining charac-
teristic of consciousness, namely its experiential quality, not deducible from
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these elements of classical physical theory, and that is all that classical phys-
ical theory entails.
The fact that quantum theory is intrinsically a theory of mind-matter
interaction was not lost upon the early founders and workers. Wolfgang
Pauli, John von Neumann, and Eugene Wigner were three of the most rig-
orous thinkers of that time. They all recognized that quantum theory was
about the mind-brain connection, and they tried to develop that idea. How-
ever, most physicists were more interested in experiments on relatively simple
atomic systems, and were understandably reluctant to get sucked into the
huge question of the connection between mind and brain. They were willing
to sacrifice certain formerly-held ideals, and take practical success to be the
basic criterion of good science.
This retreat both buttressed, and was buttressed by, two of the main
philosophical movements of the twentieth century. One of these, materialism-
behaviourism, effectively denied the existence of our conscious “inner lives”,
and the other, postmodern-social-consructionism, viewed science as a social
construct without any objective mind-independent content. The time was
not yet ripe, either philosophically or scientifically, for a serious attempt to
study the physics of mind-matter connection. Today, however, as we enter
the third millenium, there is a huge surge of interest among philosophers,
psychologists, and neuroscientists in reconnecting the aspects of nature that
were torn asunder by seventeenth century physicists.
John von Neumann was one of the most brilliant mathematicians and
logicians of his age. He followed where the mathematics and logic led. From
the point of view of the mathematics of quantum theory it makes no sense
to treat a measuring device as intrisically different from the collection of
atomic constituents that make it up. A device is just another part of the
physical universe, and it should be treated as such. Moreover, the conscious
thoughts of a human observer ought to be causally connected most directly
and immediately to what is happening in his brain, not to what is happening
out at some measuring device.
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The mathematical rules of quantum theory specify clearly how the mea-
suring devices are to be included in the quantum mechanically described
physical world. Von Neumann first formulated carefully the mathematical
rules of quantum theory, and then followed where that mathematics led.
It led first to the incorporation of the measuring devices into the quantum
mechanically described physical universe, and eventually to the inclusion of
everything built out of atoms and their constituents. Our bodies and brains
thus become, in von Neumann’s approach, parts of the quantum mechani-
cally described physical universe. Treating the entire physical universe in this
unified way provides a conceptually simple and logically coherent theoretical
foundation that heals the rupturing of the physical world introduced by the
Copenhagen approach. It postulates, for each observer, that each experien-
tial event is connected in a certain specified way to a corresponding brain
event. The dynamical rules that connect mind and brain are very restrictive,
and this leads to a mind-brain theory with significant explanatory power.
Von Neumann showed in principle how all of the predictions of Copen-
hagen quantum theory are contained in his version. However, von Neumann
quantum theory gives, in principle, much more than Copenhagen quantum
theory can. By providing an objective description of the entire history of
the universe, rather than merely rules connecting human observations, von
Neumann’s theory provides a quantum framework for cosmological and bio-
logical evolution. And by including both brain and knowledge, and also the
dynamical laws that connect them, the theory provides a rationally coherent
dynamical framework for understanding the relationship between brain and
mind.
There is, however, one major obstacle: von Neumann’s theory, as he
formulated it, appears to conflict with Einstein’s theory of relativity.
Reconciliation with Relativity
Von Neumann formulated his theory in a nonrelativistic approximation:
he made no attempt to reconcile it with the empirically validated features of
Einstein’s theory of relativity.
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Today this reconciliation is easily achieved. One can simply replace the
nonrelativistic theory used by von Neumann with relativistic quantum field
theory.
To deal with the mind-brain interaction one needs to consider the physical
processes in human brains. The relevant quantum field theory is quantum-
elecrodynamics. The relevant energy range is that of atomic and molecular
interactions. I shall assume that whatever high-energy theory eventually
prevails in quantum physics, it will reduce to quantum electrodynamics in
this low-energy regime.
But there remains one apparent problem: von Neumann’s nonrelativistic
theory is built on the Newtonian concept of the instants of time, ‘now’,
each of which extends over all space. The evolving state of the universe,
S(t), is defined to be the state of the entire universe at the instant of time
t. However, Einstein’s theory of relativity rejected, at least within classical
physical theory, the idea that the Newtonian concept of the instant “now”
could have any objective meaning.
Tomonaga [13] and Schwinger [14] have constructed a standard formu-
lation of relativistic quantum field theory. It has effective instants “now”,
namely the Tomonaga-Schwinger surfaces σ. Pauli once strongly emphasized
to me that these surfaces, while they give a certain aura of relativistic in-
variance, do not differ significantly from the constant-time surfaces “now”
that appear in the Newtonian physics. All efforts to remove completely from
quantum theory the distinctive character of time, in comparison to space,
have failed.
To obtain a relativistic version of von Neumann’s theory one need merely
identify the sequence of constant-time surfaces “now” in his theory with a
corresponding objectively defined sequence of Tomonaga-Schwinger surfaces
σ.
Giving special objective physical status to a particular sequence of space-
like surfaces σ, say the constant-time surfaces in some one particular Lorentz
frame, does not disrupt the covariance properties of the empirical predictions
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of the theory: that was one of the main consequences of the Tomonoga-
Schwinger formulation. Although each reduction of the state vector is taken
to occur instantaneously along one of the preferred set of surfaces σ the pre-
dictions about observations remain independent of which sequence of surfaces
σ is chosen (e.g., which Lorentz frame is used to define the preferred sequence
of surfaces). Thus this relativistic version of von Neumann’s theory is fully
compatible with the theory of relativity at the level of empirically accessible
relationships. However, the theory does conflict with a metaphysical idea
spawned by the theory of relativity, namely the idea that there is no dynam-
ically preferred sequence of instantaneous “nows”. Thus theory reverts, at a
certain deep ontological level, to the Newtonian idea of instantaneous action
at a distance, while maintaining all of the empirical demands of the theory
of relativity.
The astronomical data [15] indicates that there does exist, in the observed
universe, a preferred sequence of ‘nows’: they define the special set of surfaces
in which, for the early universe, matter was distributed almost uniformly in
mean local velocity, temperature, and density. It is natural to assume that
these empirically specified surfaces are the same as the objective preferred
surfaces “now” of von Neumann quantum theory.
Nonlocality and Relativity
von Neumann’s objective theory immediately accounts for the faster-
than-light transfer of information that seems to be entailed by the nonlocality
experiments: the outcome that appears first, in the cited experiment, occurs
in one or the other of the two Swiss villages. According to the theory, this
earlier event has an immediate instantaneous effect on the evolving state of
the universe, and this change has an immediate effect on the propensities for
the various possible outcomes of the measurement performed slightly later
in the other village.
This feature—that there is some sort of objective instantaneous transfer
of information—conflicts with the spirit of the theory of relativity. However,
this quantum effect is of a subtle kind: it acts neither on material substance,
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nor on locally conserved energy-momentum, nor on anything else that exists
in the classical conception of the physical world that the theory of relativity
was originally designed to cover. It acts on a mathematical structure that
represents, rather, information and propensities.
The theory of relativity was originally formulated within classical physical
theory. This is a deterministic theory: the entire history of the universe is
completely determined by how things started out. Hence all of history can
be conceived to be laid out in a four-dimensional spacetime. The idea of
“becoming”, or of the gradual unfolding of reality, has no natural place in
this deterministic conception of the universe.
Quantum theory is a different kind of theory: it is formulated as an
indeterministic theory. Determinism is relaxed in two important ways. First,
freedom is granted to each experimenter to choose freely which experiment
he will perform, i.e., which aspect of nature he will probe; which question
he will put to nature. Then Nature is allowed to pick an outcome of the
experiment, i.e., to answer to the question. This answer is partially free: it is
subject only to certain statistical requirements. These elements of ‘freedom
of choice’, on the part of both the human participant and Nature herself,
lead to a picture of a reality that gradually unfolds in response to choices
that are not necessarily fixed by the prior physical part of reality alone.
The central roles in quantum theory of these discrete choices— the choices
of which questions will be put to nature, and which answer nature delivers—
makes quantum theory a theory of discrete events, rather than a theory of the
continuous evolution of locally conserved matter/energy. The basic building
blocks of the new conception of nature are not objective tiny bits of matter,
but choices of questions and answers.
In view of these deep structural differences there is a question of prin-
ciple regarding how the stipulation that there can be no faster-than-light
transfer of information of any kind should be carried over from the invalid
deterministic classical theory to its indeterministic quantum successor.
The theoretical advantages of relaxing this condition are great: it pro-
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vides an immediate resolution all of the causality puzzles that have blocked
attempts to understand physical reality, and that have led directly to the
Copenhagen renunciation of all such efforts. And it hands to us a new ra-
tional theoretical basis for attacking the age-old problem of the connection
between mind and brain.
In view of these potential advantages one must ask whether it is really
beneficial for scientists to renounce for all time the aim of trying to un-
derstand the world in which we live, in order to maintain a metaphysical
prejudice that arose from a theory that is known to be fundamentally incor-
rect?
I use the term “metaphysical prejudice” because there is no theoretical
or empirical evidence that supports the non-existence of the subtle sort of
instantaneous action that is involved here. Indeed, both theory and the non-
locality experiments, taken at face value, seem to demand it. The denial of
the possibility of any such action is a metaphysical commitment that was
useful in the context of classical physical theory. But that earlier theory con-
tains no counterpart of the informational structure upon which the putative
action in question acts.
Renouncing the endeavour to understand nature is a price too heavy to
pay to preserve a metaphysical prejudice.
Is Nonlocality Real?
I began this article with the quote from Physics Today: “Nonlocality
gets more real.” The article described experiments whose outcomes were
interpreted as empirical evidence that nature was nonlocal, in some sense.
But do nonlocality experiments of this kind provide any real evidence that
information is actually transferred over spacelike intervals? An affirmative
answer to this question would provide support for rejecting the metaphysical
prejudice in question
The evidence is very strong that the predictions of quantum theory are
valid in these experiments involving pairs of measurements performed at
essentially the same time in regions lying far apart. But the question is
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this: Does the fact that the predictions of quantum theory are correct in
experiments of this kind actually show that information must be transferred
instantaneously, in some (Lorentz) frame of reference?
The usual arguments that connect these experiments to nonlocal action
stem from the work of John Bell [16]. What Bell did was this. He noted
that the argument of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen was based on a certain
assumption, namely that “Physical Reality”, whatever it was, should have
at least one key property: What is physically real in one region should not
depend upon which experiment an experimenter in a faraway region freely
chooses to do at essentially the same instant of time. Einstein and his col-
laborators showed that if this property is valid then the physical reality
in a certain region must include, or specify, the values that certain unper-
formed measurements would have revealed if they, rather than the actually
performed measurements, had been performed. However, Copenhagen quan-
tum theory cannot accommodate well defined outcomes of these not-actually-
performed measurements. Thus the Einstein-Podilsky-Rosen argument, if
correct, would prove that the quantum framework cannot be a complete de-
scription of physical reality.
Bohr countered this argument by rejecting the claimed key property of
physical reality: he denied the claim pertaining to no instantaneous action
at a distance. That rebuttal is subtle, and many physicists (e.g. Einstein
and John Bell) and philosophers (e.g. Karl Popper) doubted that Bohr had
successfully answered the EPR argument.
Bell found a more direct way to counter the argument of Einstein, Podol-
sky, and Rosen. He accepted both their claim that the results of these it
unperformed measurements are indeed physically real, and that these phys-
ical realities could not be influenced by what far-away experimenters choose
to measure at essentially the same instant of time. And he assumed, as did
all the disputants, that the predictions of quantum theory were correct.
From these assumptions Bell deduced a mathematical contradiction, thereby
showing that something must be wrong with either the conclusions of Ein-
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stein, Podolsky, and Rosen, or with the no-faster-than-light-influence as-
sumption. But Bell’s argument did not fixed exactly where the trouble lies.
Does the trouble lie with the assumption of no faster-than-light influence,
or with the EPR conclusion that the outcomes of the unperformed measure-
ments are physically real?
Orthodox quantum theorists have no trouble answering this question: the
assumption that outcomes of unperformed measurements are physically real
is wrong. This idea directly contradicts quantum philosophy!
This answer allows one to retain Einstein’s reasonable-sounding assump-
tion that physical reality in one place cannot be influence by what a faraway
experimenter freely chooses to do at the same instant: the Bell’s argument
neither entails, nor even suggests, the existence of faster-than-light influences.
Bell, and others who followed his “hidden-variable” approach, later used
assumptions that appear weaker than this original one. However, these later
assumptions are essentially the same as the earlier one: they turn out to entail
[17, 18] the possibility of defining numbers that could specify, simultaneously,
the values that all the relevant unperformed measurements would reveal if
they were to be performed. But, as just mentioned, one of the basic precepts
quantum philosophy is that such numbers do not exist.
Eliminating Hidden Variables
The purpose of Bell’s argument is different from that of Einstein, Podol-
sky, and Rosen, and the logical demands are different. The challenge faced by
Einstein and his colleagues was to mount an argument built directly on the
orthodox quantum principles themselves. For only by proceeding in this way
could they get a logical hook on the quantum physicists that they wanted to
convince.
This demand posed a serious problem for Einstein and co-workers. Their
argument, like Bell’s, involved a consideration of the values that unperformed
measurements would reveal if they were to be performed. Indeed, it was pre-
cisely the Copenhagen claim that such values do not exist that Einstein and
company wanted to prove untenable. But they needed to establish the exis-
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tence of such values without begging the question by making an assumption
that was equivalent to what the were trying to show.
The strategy of Einstein et. al. was to prove the existence of such values
by using only quantum precepts themselves, plus the seemingly secure idea
from the theory of relativity that what is physically real here and now cannot
be influenced by what a faraway experimenter chooses to do now.
This strategy succeeded: Bohr was forced into an awkward position of
rejecting Einstein’s premise that “physical reality” could not be influenced
by what a faraway experimenter chooses to do:
“...there is essentally the question of an influence on the very conditions
which define the possible types of predictions regarding future behavior of
the system. Since these conditions constitute an inherent element of any
phenomena to which the term ‘physically reality’ can be properly attached we
see that the argument of mentioned authors does not justify their conclusion
that quantum-mechanical description is essentially incomplete.”[8]
I shall pursue here a strategy similar to that of Einstein and his col-
leagues, and will be led to a conclusion similar to Bohr’s, namely the failure
of Einstein’s assumption that physical reality cannot be influenced from afar.
Values of unperformed measurements can be brought into the theoretical
analysis by combining two ideas that are embraced by Copenhagen philos-
ophy. The first of these is the freedom of experimenters to choose which
measurements they will perform. In Bohr’s words:
“The freedom of experimentation, presupposed in classical physics, is of
course retained and corresponds to the free choice of experimental arrange-
ments for which the mathematical structure of the quantum mechanical for-
malism offers the appropriate latitude.”[19]
This assumption is important for Bohr’s notion of complementarity: some
information about all the possible choices is simultaneously present in the
quantum state, and Bohr wanted to provide the possibility that any one of
the mutually exclusive alternatives might be pertinent. Whichever choice the
experimenter eventually makes, the associated set of predictions is assumed
15
to hold.
The second idea is the condition of no backward-in-time causation. Ac-
cording to quantum thinking, experimenters are to be considered free to
choose which measurement they will perform. Moreover, if an outcome of
a measurement appears to an observer at a time earlier than some time T ,
then this outcome can be considered to be fixed and settled at that time
T , independently of which experiment will be freely chosen and performed
by another experimenter at a time later than T : the later choice is allowed
go either way without disturbing the outcome that has already appeared to
observers at an earlier time.
I shall make the weak assumption that this no-backward-in-time-influence
condition holds for at least one coordinate system (x,y,z,t).
These two conditions are, I believe, completely compatible with quantum
thinking, and are a normal part of orthodox quantum thinking. They con-
tradict no quantum precept or combination of quantum predictions. They,
by themselves, lead to no contradiction. But they do introduce into the
theoretical framework a very limited notion of a result of an unperformed
measurement, namely the result of a measurement that is actually performed
in one region at an earlier time T coupled with the measurment NOT per-
formed later by some faraway experimenter. My assumption is that this
early outcome, which is actually observered by someone, can be treated as
existing independently of which of the two alternative choices is made by
the experimenter in the later region, even though only one of the two later
options can be realized. This assumption of no influence backward in time
constitutes the small element of counterfactuality that provides the needed
logical toe-hold.
The Hardy Experimental Setup
To get a nonlocality conclusion like the one obtained from Bell-type the-
orems, but from assumptions that are in line with the precepts of quantum
theory, it is easiest to consider an experiment of the kind first discussed by
Lucien Hardy [20]. The setup is basically similar to the ones considered in
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proofs of Bell’s theorem. There are two spacetime regions, L and R, that are
“spacelike separated”. This condition means that the two regions are situ-
ated far apart in space relative to their extensions in time, so that no point
in either region can be reached from any point in the other without moving
either faster than the speed of light or backward in time. This means also
that in some frame of reference, which I take to be the coordinate system
(x,y,z,t) mentioned above, the region L lies at times greater than time T , and
the region R lies earlier than time T .
In each region an experimenter freely chooses between two possible ex-
periments. Each experiment will, if chosen, be performed within that region,
and its outcome will appear to observers within that region. Thus neither
choice can affect anything located in the other region without there being
some influence that acts faster than the speed of light or backward in time.
The argument involves four predictions made by quantum theory under
the Hardy conditions. These conditions and predictions are described in Box
1.
——————————————————————–
Box 1: Predictions of quantum theory for the Hardy experi-
ment.
The two possible experiments in region L are labelled L1 and L2.
The two possible experiments in region R are labelled R1 and R2.
The two possible outcomes of L1 are labelled L1+ and L1-, etc.
The Hardy setup involves a laser down-conversion source that emits a pair
of correlated photons. The experimental conditions are such that quantum
theory makes the following four predictions:
1. If (L1,R2) is performed and L1- appears in L then R2+ must appear
in R.
2. If (L2,R2) is performed and R2+ appears in R then L2+ must appear in
L.
3. If (L2,R1) is performed and L2+ appears in L then R1- must appear in
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R.
4. If (L1,R1) is performed and L1- appears in L then R1+ appears sometimes
in R.
The three words “must” mean that the specified outcome is predicted to
occur with certainty (i.e., probability unity).
—————————————————————————
Two Simple Conclusions
It is easy to deduce from our assumptions two simple conclusions.
Recall that region R lies earlier than time T , and that region L lies later
than time T .
Suppose the actually selected pair of experiments is (R2, L1), and that
the outcome L1- appears in region L. Then prediction 1 of quantum theory
entails that R2+ must have already appeared in R prior to time T . The
no-backward-in-time-influence condition then entails that this outcome R2+
was fixed and settled prior to time T , independently of which way the later
free choice in L will eventually go: the outcome in region R at the earlier
time would still be R2+ even if the later free choice had gone the other way,
and L2 had been chosen instead of L1.
Under this alternative condition (L2,R2,R2+) the experiment L1 would
not be performed, and there would be no physical reality corresponding to
its outcome. But the actual outcome in R would still be R2+, and we
are assuming that the predictions of quantum theory will hold no matter
which of the two experiments is eventually performed later in L. Prediction
2 of quantum theory asserts that it must be L2+. This yields the following
conclusion:
Assertion A(R2):
If (R2,L1) is performed and outcome L1- appears in region L, then if
the choice in L had gone the other way, and L2, instead of L1, had been
performed in L then outcome L2+ would have appeared there.
Because we have two predictions that hold with certainty, and the two
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strong assumptions of ‘free choice’ and ‘no backward causation’, it is not
surprising that we have been able to derive this conclusion. In an essentially
deterministic context we are often able to deduce from the outcome of one
measurement what would have happened if we had made, instead, another
measurement. Indeed, if knowing the later actual outcome allows one to
know what some earlier condition must have been, and if this earlier condi-
tion entails a unique result of the later alternative measurement, then one
can conclude from knowledge of the later actual outcome what would have
happened if, instead, the later alternative measurement had been performed.
This is about the simplest possible example of counterfactual reasoning.
Consider next the same assertion, but with R2 replaced by R1:
Assertion A(R1):
If (R1,L1) is performed and outcome L1- appears in region L, then if
the choice in L had gone the other way, and L2, instead of L1, had been
performed in L then outcome L2+ would have appeared there.
This assertion cannot be true. The fourth prediction of quantum theory
asserts that under the specified conditions L1- and R1 the outcome R1+
sometimes appears in R. The no-backward-in-time-influence condition en-
sures that this earlier appearance of R1+ would not be altered if the later
choice in region L had gone the other way and L2 had been chosen there:
that is our basic causality assumption. But A(R1) asserts that under this
condition that L2 is performed later the outcome L2+ must appear in L.
But if L2+ were to occur under this condition (L2,R1) then the third pre-
diction entails that then R1- must appear in R. That conclusion contradicts
the previously established result that under these conditions R1+ sometimes
appears in R.
Thus, given the validity of the four predictions of quantum theory, and
of our basic causality condition, the validity of assertion A(R1) cannot be
maintained.
The fact that A(R2) is true and A(R1) is false entails a certain nonlocal
connection. The truth of the first of these statements means that certain
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assumptions that are compatible with quantum philosophy, and that proba-
bly are parts of quantum philosophy, as it is understood by most quantum
physicists, entail a connection of the following form: “If experiment E1 is
performed in region L and gives outcome O1 in region L then if, instead, ex-
periment E2 had been performed in region L the outcome in region L would
have been O2.” This result is similar to what Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen
tried to prove, but is weaker, because it does not claim that the two outcomes
exist simultaneously. However, it is derived from weaker assumptions: it is
not based on the criterion for “Physical Reality” that Einstein, Podolsky,
and Rosen used, but Bohr rejected. This weaker conclusion, alone, does not
directly contradict any precept of quantum philosophy. But the conjunction
of the two statements, “A(R2) is true and A(R1) is false” leads to a problem.
It asserts that a theoretical constraint upon what nature can choose in region
L, under conditions freely chosen by the experimenter in region L, depends
nontrivially on which experiment is freely chosen by the experimenter in re-
gions R: a theoretical constraint on Nature’s choices in L depends upon what
a faraway experimenter freely decides to do in R. Any theoretical model that
is compatible with the premises of the argument would have to maintain
these theoretical constraints on nature’s choices in region L, and hence en-
force the nontrivial dependence of these constraints on the free choice made
in region R. But this dependence cannot be upheld without the information
about the free choice made in region R getting to region L: some sort of
faster-than-light tranfer of information is required.
This conclusion does not cover Everett-type theories, which reject at the
outset the fundamental idea used here that definite outcomes actually occur.
This extensive discussion of nonlocality buttresses the critical assump-
tion of the objective interpretation von Neumann’s formulation of quantum
theory that is being developed here, namely the assumption that there is a
preferred set of successive instants “now” associated with the evolving ob-
jective quantum state of the universe, and that the reduction process acts
instantly along these surfaces. This assumption is completely compatible
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with the relativistic covariance of all the predictions of relativistic quantum
field theory: that is demonstrated by the Tomonaga-Schwinger formulation
of relativistic quantum field theory [13,14].
The Physical World as Information
Von Neumann quantum theory is designed to yield all the predictions of
Copenhagen quantum theory. It must therefore encompass the increments of
knowledge that Copenhagen quantum theory makes predictions about. Von
Neumann’s theory is, in fact, essentially a theory of the interaction of these
subjective realities with an evolving objective physical universe.
Von Neumann makes clear the fact that he is trying to tie together the
subjective perceptual and objective physical aspects of nature: “it is inher-
ently entirely correct that the measurement or related process of subjective
perception is a new entity relative to the physical environment and is not re-
ducible to the latter. Indeed, subjective perception leads to the intellectual
inner life of the individual...”p.418; “experience only makes statements of the
following type: an observer has made a certain (subjective) observation; and
never any like this: a physical quantity has a certain value.” p.420: In the
final stage of his analysis he divides the world into parts I, II, and III, where
part “I was everything up to the retina of the observer, II was his retina,
nerve tracts and brain, and III his abstract ‘ego’ ”. Clearly, his “abstract
ego” involves his consciousness. Von Neumann’s formulation of quantum
theory develops the dynamics of the interaction between these three parts.
The evolution of the physical universe involves three related processes.
The first is the deterministic evolution of the state of the physical universe. It
is controlled by the Schroedinger equation of relativistic quantum field theory.
This process is a local dynamical process, with all the causal connections
arising solely from interactions between neighboring localized microscopic
elements. However, this local process holds only during the intervals between
quantum events.
Each of these quantum events involves two other processes. The first is a
choice of a Yes-No question by the mind-brain system. The second of these
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two processes is a choice by Nature of an answer, either Yes or No, to that
question. This second choice is partially free: it is a random choice, subject
to the statistical rules of quantum theory. The first choice is the analog in
von Neumann theory of an essential process in Copenhagen quantum theory,
namely the free choice made by the experimenter as to which aspect of nature
is going to be probe. This choice of which aspect of nature is going to be
probed, i.e., of which specific question is going to be put to nature, is an
essential element of quantum theory: the quantum statistical rules cannot
be applied until, and unless, some specific question is first selected.
In Copenhagen quantum theory this choice is made by an experimenter,
and this experimenter lies outside the system governed by the quantum rules.
This feature of Copenhagen quantum theory is not altered in the transition to
von Neumann quantum theory: choice by an individual, of which question will
be put to nature, is not controlled by any rules that are known or understood
within contempory physics. This choice on the part of the mind-brain-body
system that constitutes the individual is, in this specific sense, a free choice:
it is not governed by the physical laws of contemporary physics (i.e., quantum
theory). This freedom constitutes a logical “gap” in the dynamical rules of
quantum theory.
Only Yes-No questions are permitted: all other possibilities can be re-
duced to these. Thus each answer, Yes or No, injects one “bit” of informa-
tion into the quantum universe. These bits of information are stored in the
evolving objective quantum state of the universe, which is a compendium
of these bits of information. But it evolves in accordance with the laws of
atomic physics. Thus the quantum state has an ontological character that is
in part matter like, since it is expressed in terms of the variables of atomic
physics, and evolves between events under the control of the laws of atomic
physics. However, each event injects the information associated with a sub-
jective perception by some observing system into the objective state of the
universe.
This conceptualization of natural process arises not from some precon-
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ceived speculative intuition, but directly from an examination of the math-
ematical structure injected into science by our study of the structure of the
relationships between our experiences. The quantum state state of the uni-
verse is thus rooted in atomic properties, yet is an informational structure
that interacts with, and carries into the future, the informational content of
each mental event. This state has effective causal efficacy because it controls,
via statistical laws, the propensities for the occurrence of subsequent events.
Once the physical world is understood in this way, as an atomistically
stored compendium of locally efficacious bits of information, the instanta-
neous transfers of information along the preferred surfaces “now” can be
understood to be changes, not in just human knowledge, as in the Copen-
hagen interpretation, but in an absolute state of objective information.
Mind-Brain Interaction and Decoherence
Von Neumann quantum theory is essentially a theory of the interaction
between the evolving objective state of the physical universe and a sequence of
mental events, each of which is associated with a localized individual system.
The theory specifies the general form of the interaction between subjective
knowings associated with individual physical systems and the physical states
of those systems. The mathematical structure automatically ensures that
when the state of the individual physical system associated with a mental
event is brought into alignment with the content of that mental event the
entire universe is simultaneously brought into alignment with that mental
content. No special arrangement is needed to produce this key result: it
is an unavoidable consequence of the quantum entanglements that are built
into the mathematical structure.
An essential feature of quantum brain dynamics is the strong action of
the environment upon the brain. This action creates a powerful tendency for
the brain to transform almost instantly [21] into an ensemble of components,
each of which is very similar to an entire classically-described brain. I assume
that this transformation does indeed occur, and exploit it in two important
ways. First, this close connection to classical physics makes the dynamics
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easy to describe: classical language and imagery can be used to describe in
familar terms how the brain behaves. Second, this description in familar
classical terms makes it easy to identify the important ways in which the
actual behaviour differs from what classical physics would predict.
A key micro-property of the human brain pertains to the migration of
calcium ions from the micro-channels through which these ions enter the
interior of nerve terminals to the sites where they trigger the release the
contents of a vesicle of neuro-transmitter. The quantum mechanical rules
entail [22] that each release of the contents of a vesicle of neurotransmitter
generates a quantum splitting of the brain into different classically describ-
able components, or branches. Evolutionary considerations entail that the
brain must keep the brain-body functioning in a coordinated way and, more
specifically, must plan and effectuate, in any normally encountered situation,
a single coherent course of action that meets the needs of that individual.
But due to the quantum splitting mentioned above, the quantum brain will
tend to decompose into components that specify alternative possible courses
of action. Thus the purely mechanical evolution of the state of the brain in
accordance with the Schroedinger equation will normally causes the brain
to evolve into a growing ensemble of alternative branches, each of which is
essentially an entire classically described brain that specifies a possible plan
of action.
This ensemble that constitutes the quantum brain is mathematically sim-
ilar to an ensemble that occurs in a classical treatment when one takes into
account the uncertainties in our knowledge of the intitial conditions of the
particles and fields that constitute the classical representation of a brain.
This close connection between what quantum theory gives and what classi-
cal physics gives is the basic reason why von Neumann quantum theory is
able to produce all of the correct predictions of classical physics. To unearth
specific differences caused by quantum effects one can start from this sim-
ilarity at the lowest-order approximation, which yields the classical results,
but then dig deeper.
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The Passive and Active Roles of Mind
The founders of quantum theory recognized that the mathematical struc-
ture of quantum theory is naturally suited for, and seems to require, bringing
into the dynamical equations two separate aspects of the interaction between
the physical universe and the minds of the experimenter/observers. The first
of these two aspects is the role of the experimenter in choosing what to at-
tend to; which aspect of nature he wants to probe; which question he wants
to ask about the physical world. This is the active role of mind. The second
aspect is the recognition, or coming to know, the answer that nature returns.
This is the passive role of mind.
The Active Physical Counterpart to the Passive Mental Event
I have mention the Schroedinger evolution of the state S(t) of the uni-
verse. The second part of the orthodox quantum dynamics consists of an
event that discards from the ensemble of quasi-classical elements mentioned
above those elements that are incompatible with the answer that nature re-
turns. This reduction of the prior ensemble of elements, which constitute the
quantum mechanical representation of the brain, to the subensemble com-
patible with the “outcome of the query” is analogous to what happens in
classical statistical mechanics when new information about the physical sys-
tem is obtained. However, in the quantum case one must in principle regard
the entire ensemble of classically described brains as real, because interference
between the different elements are in principle possible.
Each quantum event consists, then of a pair of events, one physical, the
other mental. The physical event reduces the initial ensemble that constitutes
the brain prior to the event to the subensemble consisting of those branches
that are compatible with the informational content of the associated mental
event.
This dynamical connection means that, during an interval of conscious
thinking, the brain changes by an alternation between two processes. The
first is the generation, by a local deterministic mechanical rule, of an expand-
ing profusion of alternative possible branches, with each branch correspond-
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ing to an entire classically describable brain embodying some specific possible
course of action. The quantum brain is the entire ensemble of these sepa-
rate, but equally real, quasi-classical branches. The second process involves
an event that has both physical and mental aspects. The physical aspect,
or event, chops off all branches that are incompatible with the associated
mental aspect, or event. For example, if the mental event is the experienc-
ing of some feature of the physical world, then the associated physical event
would be the updating of the brain’s representation of that aspect of the
physical world. This updating of the (quantum) brain is achieved by dis-
carding from the ensemble of quasi-classical brain states all those branches
in which the brain’s representation of the physical world is incompatible with
the information content of the mental event.
This connection is similar to a functionalist account of consciouness. But
here it is expressed in terms of a dynamical interaction that is demanded
by the requirement that the objective formulation of the theory yield the
same predictions about connections between our conscious experiences that
the empirically validated Copenhagen quantum theory gives. The interac-
tion is the exact expression of the basic dynamical rule of quantum theory,
which is the stipulation that each increment in knowledge is associated with
a reduction of the quantum state to one that is compatible with the new
knowledge.
The quantum brain is an ensemble of quasi-classical components. As just
noted, this structure is similar to something that occurs in classical statis-
tical mechanics, namely a “classical statistical ensemble.” But a classical
statistical ensemble, though structurally similar to a quantum brain, is fun-
damentally a different kind of thing. It is a representation of a set of truly
distinct possibilities, only one of which is real. A classical statistical ensemble
is used when a person does not know which of the conceivable possibilities is
real, but can assign a ‘probability’ to each possibility. In contrast, all of the
elements of the ensemble that constitute a quantum brain are equally real:
no choice has yet been made among them, Consequently, and this is the key
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point, entire ensemble acts as a whole in the determination of the upcoming
mind-brain event.
Each thought is associated with the actualization of some macroscopic
quasi-stable features of the brain. Thus the reduction event is a macroscopic
happening. Moreover, this event involves, dynamically, the entire ensemble
of quasi-classical brain states. In the corresponding classical model each
element of the ensemble evolves independently, in accordance with a micro-
local law of motion that involves just that one branch alone. Thus there are
basic dynamical differences between the quantum and classical models, and
the consequences of these dynamical differences need to be studied in order
to exhibit the quantum effects.
The only freedom in the theory—insofar as we leave Nature’s choices
alone—is the choice made by the individual about which question it will ask
next, and when it will ask it. These are the only inputs of mind to the
dynamics of the brain. This severe restriction on the role of mind is what
gives the theory its predictive power. Without this restriction mind could be
free to do anything, and the theory would have no consequences.
Asking a question about something is closely connected to focussing one’s
attention on it. Attending to something is the act of directing one’s mental
power to some task. This task might be to update one’s representation of
some feature of the surrounding world, or to plan or execute some other sort
of mental or physical action.
The key question is then: Can this freedom merely to choose which ques-
tion is asked, and when it is asked, lead to any statistical influence of mind
on the behaviour of the brain, where a ‘statistcal’ influence is a influence on
values obtained by averaging over the properly weighted possibilities.
The answer is Yes!
The Quantum Zeno Effect
There is an important and well studied effect in quantum theory that
depends on the timings of the reduction events arising from the queries put
to nature. It is called the Quantum Zeno Effect. It is not diminished by
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interaction with the environment [23].
The effect is simple. If the same question is put to nature sufficiently
rapidly and the initial answer is Yes, then any noise-induced diffusion, or
force-induced motion, of the system away from the subensemble where the
answer is ‘Yes’ will be suppressed: the system will tend to be confined to
the subensemble where the answer is ‘Yes’. The effect is sometimes called
the “watched pot” effect: according to the old adage “A watched pot never
boils”; just looking at it keeps it from changing. Also, a state can be pulled
along in some direction by posing a rapid sequence of questions that change
sufficiently slowly over time. In short, according to the dynamical laws of
quantum mechanics, the freedom to choose which questions are put to nature,
and when they are asked, allows mind to influence the behaviour of the brain.
A person is aware of almost none of the processing that is going on in his
brain: unconscious brain action does almost everthing. So it would be both
unrealistic and theoretically unfeasible to give mind unbridled freedom: the
questions posed by mind ought to be determined in large measure by brain.
What freedom is given to man?
According to this theory, the freedom given to Nature is simply to provide
a Yes or No answer to a question posed by a subsystem. It seems reasonable
to restrict in a similar way the choice given to a human mind.
A Simple Dynamical Model
It is easy to construct a simple dynamical model in which the brain does
most of the work, in a mechanical way, and the mind, by means of choices
between ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ options, merely gives top-level quidance.
Let {P} be the set of projection operator that act only on the brain-
body of the individual and that correspond to possible mental events of the
individual. Let P (t) be the P in {P} that maximizes TrPS(t), where S(t) is
the state of the universe at time t. This P (t) represents the “best possible”
question that could be asked by the individual at time t. Let the question
associated with P (t) be posed if P (t) reaches a local maximum. If nature
returns the answer ‘Yes’ then the mental event associated with P (t) occurs.
Mental control comes in only through the option to rapidly pose this same
question repeatedly, thus activating the Quantum Zeno Effect, which will
tend to keep the state of the brain focussed on the plan of action specified
by P .
The Quantum Zeno Effect will not freeze up the brain completely. It
merely keeps the state of the brain in the subspace where attention is focussed
on pursuing the plan of action specified by P .
In this model the brain does practically everything, but mind, by means of
the limited effect of consenting to the rapid re-posing of the question already
constructed and briefly presented by brain, can influence brain activity by
causing this activity to stay focussed on the presented course of action.
Agreement with Claims of William James
Does this theory explain anything?
Essentially this model was already in place [24] when a colleague, Dr.
Jeffrey Schwartz, brought to my attention some passages from “Psychology:
The Briefer Course”, written by William James [25]. In the final section of
the chapter on Attention James writes:
“I have spoken as if our attention were wholly determined by neural con-
ditions. I believe that the array of things we can attend to is so determined.
No object can catch our attention except by the neural machinery. But the
amount of the attention which an object receives after it has caught our at-
tention is another question. It often takes effort to keep mind upon it. We
feel that we can make more or less of the effort as we choose. If this feeling
be not deceptive, if our effort be a spiritual force, and an indeterminate one,
then of course it contributes coequally with the cerebral conditions to the
result. Though it introduce no new idea, it will deepen and prolong the stay
in consciousness of innumerable ideas which else would fade more quickly
away. The delay thus gained might not be more than a second in duration—
but that second may be critical; for in the rising and falling considerations
in the mind, where two associated systems of them are nearly in equilibrium
it is often a matter of but a second more or less of attention at the outset,
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whether one system shall gain force to occupy the field and develop itself and
exclude the other, or be excluded itself by the other. When developed it may
make us act, and that act may seal our doom. When we come to the chapter
on the Will we shall see that the whole drama of the voluntary life hinges
on the attention, slightly more or slightly less, which rival motor ideas may
receive. ...”
In the chapter on Will, in the section entitled “Volitional effort is effort
of attention” James writes:
“Thus we find that we reach the heart of our inquiry into volition when
we ask by what process is it that the thought of any given action comes to
prevail stably in the mind.”
and later
“The essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most ‘volun-
tary,’ is to attend to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind. ...
Effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will.”
Still later, James says:
“Consent to the idea’s undivided presence, this is effort’s sole achieve-
ment.” ...“Everywhere, then, the function of effort is the same: to keep
affirming and adopting the thought which, if left to itself, would slip away.”
This description of the effect of mind on the course of mind-brain process
is remarkably in line with what had been proposed independently from purely
theoretical consideration of the quantum physics of this process. The con-
nections claimed by James are explained of the basis of the same dynamical
principles that had been introduced by physicists explain atomic phenomena.
Thus the whole range of science, from atomic physics to mind-brain dynam-
ics, is brought together in a single rationally coherent theory of an evolving
cosmos that consists of a physical reality that represents information, inter-
acting via the laws of atomic physics with the closely related, but differently
constituted, mental aspects of nature.
Agreement With Recent Work on Attention
Much experimental work on attention and effort has occurred since the
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time of William James. That work has been hampered by the nonexistence
of any putative physical theory that purports to explain how our conscious
experiences influence activities in our brains. The behaviourist approach,
which dominated psychological during the first half of the twentieth century,
and which essentially abolished, in this field, not only the use of introspective
data but also the very concept of consciousness, was surely motivated in part
by the fact that consciousness had no natural place within the framework
of classical physical theory. According to the principles of classical physi-
cal theory, consciousness makes no difference in behavior: all behavior is,
determined by microscopic causation without ever acknowledging the exis-
tence of consciousness. Thus philosophers who accepted the ideas of classical
physics were driven to conclude that conscious experiences were either iden-
tical to corresponding classically describable activities of the brain, or were
“emergent” properties. The first idea, the identity theory of mind, seems im-
possible to reconcile with the fact that according to the classical principles
the brain is an assembly of local elements behaving in accordance with the
local laws of classical physics, and that all higher-order dynamical properties
are just re-expressions of the local causal links between the local elements.
But the existence of “feelings” and other conscious experiences is not just a
re-expression of the causal links described by the principles of classical physi-
cal theory. And any “emergent” property that emerges from a system whose
behavior is completely specified by the classical principles is only trivially
emergent, in the same sense as is the wheelness often cited by Roger Sperry:
“wheelness” did not exist in the physical world before wheels, and it exerts
top-down causation, via the causal links specified by the classical principles.
But the emergence of “wheelness” is not analogous to the emergence of “con-
sciousness”: the existence of the defining characteristics of the “wheelness”
of a wheel follows rationally from a classical physics model of a wheel, but the
existence of the defining experiential characteristics of the “consciousness” a
brain does not follow rationally from a classical physics model of the brain.
The failure of the behaviourist programs led to the rehabilitation of “at-
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tention” during the early fifties, and many hundreds of experiments have
been performed during the past fifty years for the purpose of investigating
empirically those aspects of human behaviour that we ordinarily link to our
consciousness.
Harold Pashler’s 1998 book “The Psychology of Attention” [26] describes
a great deal of this empirical work, and also the intertwined theoretical efforts
to understand the nature of an information-processing system that could ac-
count for the intricate details of the objective data. Two key concepts are
the notions of a processing “Capacity” and of “Attention”. The latter is
associated with an internally directed selection between different possible al-
locations of the available processing “Capacity”. A third concept is ”Effort”,
which is linked to incentives, and to reports by subjects of “trying harder”.
Pashler organizes his discussion by separating perceptual processing from
postperceptual processing. The former covers processing that, first of all,
identifies such basic physical properties of stimuli as location, color, loudness,
and pitch, and, secondly, identifies stimuli in terms of categories of meaning.
The postperceptual process covers the tasks of producing motor actions and
cognitive action beyond mere categorical identification. Pashler emphasizes
[p. 33] that “the empirical findings of attention studies specifically argue
for a distinction between perceptual limitations and more central limitations
involved in thought and the planning of action.” The existence of these
two different processes, with different characteristics, is a principal theme of
Pashler’s book [p. 33, 263, 293, 317, 404].
In the quantum theory of mind-brain being described here there are two
separate processes. First, there is the unconscious mechanical brain process
governed by the Schroedinger equation. As discussed in ref. 22, this brain
processing involves dynamical units that are represented by complex patterns
of neural activity (or, more generally, of brain activity) that are “facilitated”
by use, and such that each unit tends to be activated as a whole by the acti-
vation of several of its parts: this explains the development of brain process
through ”association”. The brain evolves mechanically by the dynamical in-
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terplay of these dynamic units, and by feed-back loops that strenghthen or
weaken appropriate input channels.
Each individual quasi-classical element of the ensemble of alternative pos-
sible brain states that constitutes the quantum brain creates, on the basis
of clues, or cues, coming from various sources, a plan for a possible coherent
course of action. Quantum uncertainties entail that a host of different pos-
sibilities will emerge, and hence that the quantum brain will evolve into a
set of component classically describable brains representing different possi-
ble courses of action. [See ref. 22.] This mechanical phase of the processing
already involves some selectivity, because the various input clues contribute
either more or less to the evolving brain process according to the degree to
which these inputs activate, via associations, the patterns that survive and
turn into the plan of action.
This conception of brain dynamics seems to accommodate all of the per-
ceptual aspects of the data described by Pashler. But it is the high-level
processing, which is more closely linked to our active mentally controlled
conscious thinking, that is of prime interest here. The data pertaining to
this second process is the focus of part II of Pashler’s book.
Mental intervention has, according to the quantum-physics-based theory
described here, several distinctive characteristics. It consists of a sequence
of discrete events each of which consents to an integrated course of action
presented by brain. The rapidity of these events can be increased with ef-
fort. Effort-induced speed-up of the rate of occurrence of these events can,
by means of the quantum Zeno effect, keep attention focussed on a task.
Between 100 and 300 msec of consent seem to be needed to fix a plan of
action. Effort can, by increasing the number of events per second, increase
the mental input into brain activity. Each conscious event picks out from
the multitude of quasi-classical possibilities that comprise the quantum brain
the subensemble that is compatible with the conscious experience.
The correspondence between the mental event and the associated phys-
ical event is this: the physical event reduces the prior physical ensemble
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of alternative possibilities to the subensemble compatible with the mental
event. This connection will be recognized as the core interpretive postulate
of Copenhagen quantum theory: the physical event reduces the prior state of
the observed system to the part of it that is compatible with the experience
of the observer.
Examination of Pashler’s book shows that this quantum-physics-based
theory accommodates naturally all of the complex structural features of the
empirical data that he describes. He emphasizes [p. 33] a specific finding:
strong empirical evidence for what he calls a central processing bottleneck
associated with the attentive selection of a motor action. This kind of bot-
tleneck is what the quantum-physics-based theory predicts: the bottleneck is
precisely the single linear sequence of mind-brain quantum events that von
Neumann-Wigner quantum theory is built upon.
Pashler [p. 279] describes four empirical signatures for this kind of bottle-
neck, and describes the experimental confirmation of each of them. Much of
part II of Pashler’s book is a massing of evidence that supports the existence
of a central process of this general kind.
This bottleneck is not automatic within classical physics. A classical
model could easily produce simultaneously two responses in different modal-
ities, say vocal and manual, to two different stimuli arriving via two different
modalities, say auditory and tactile: the two processes could proceed via dy-
namically independent routes. Pashler [p. 308] notes that the bottleneck is
undiminished in split-brain patients performing two tasks that, at the level
of input and output, seem to be confined to different hemispheres.
Pashler states [p. 293] “The conclusion that there is a central bottleneck
in the selection of action should not be confused with the ... debate (about
perceptual-level process) described in chapter 1. The finding that people
seem unable to select two responses at the same time does not dispute the fact
that they also have limitations in perceptual processing...”. I have already
mentioned the independent selectivity injected into brain dynamics by the
purely mechanical part of the quantum mind-brain process.
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The queuing effect for the mind-controlled motor responses does not ex-
clude interference between brain processes that are similar to each other, and
hence that use common brain mechanisms. Pashler [p. 297] notes this distinc-
tion, and says “the principles governing queuing seem indifferent to neural
overlap of any sort studied so far.” He also cites evidence that suggests that
the hypthetical timer of brain activity associated with the cerebellum “is
basically independent of the central response-selection bottleneck.”[p. 298]
The important point here is that there is in principle, in the quantum
model, an essential dynamical difference between the unconscious processing
carried out by the Schroedinger evolution, which generates via a local process
an expanding collection of classically conceivable possible courses of action,
and the process associated with the sequence of conscious events that consti-
tutes a stream of consciousness. The former are not limited by the queuing
effect, because all of the possibilities develop in parallel, whereas the latter
do form elements of a single queue. The experiments cited by Pashler all
seem to support this clear prediction of the quantum approach.
An interesting experiment mentioned by Pashler involves the simultane-
ous tasks of doing an IQ test and giving a foot response to a rapidly presented
sequences of tones of either 2000 or 250 Hz. The subject’s mental age, as
measured by the IQ test, was reduced from adult to 8 years. [p. 299] This
result supports the prediction of quantum theory that the bottleneck per-
tains to both ‘intelligent’ behaviour, which requires conscious processing,
and selection of motor response.
Another interesting experiment showed that, when performing at max-
imum speed, with fixed accuracy, subjects produced responses at the same
rate whether performing one task or two simultaneously: the limited capacity
to produce responses can be divided between two simultaneously performed
tasks. [p. 301]
Pashler also notes [p. 348] that “Recent results strengthen the case for
central interference even further, concluding that memory retrieval is sub-
ject to the same discrete processing bottleneck that prevents simultaneous
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response selection in two speeded choice tasks.”
In the section on “Mental Effort” Pashler reports that “incentives to per-
form especially well lead subjects to improve both speed and accuracy”, and
that the motivation had “greater effects on the more cognitively complex
activity”. This is what would be expected if incentives lead to effort that
produces increased rapidity of the events, each of which injects into the phys-
ical process, via quantum selection and reduction, bits of control information
that reflect mental evaluation.
Studies of sleep-deprived subjects suggest that in these cases “effort works
to counteract low arousal”. If arousal is essentially the rate of occurrence of
conscious events then this result is what the quantum model would predict.
Pashler notes that “Performing two tasks at the same time, for example,
almost invariably... produces poorer performance in a task and increases
ratings in effortfulness.” And “Increasing the rate at which events occur
in experimenter-paced tasks often increases effort ratings without affecting
performance”. “Increasing incentives often raises workload ratings and per-
formance at the same time.” All of these empirical connections are in line
with the general principle that effort increases the rate of conscious events,
each of which inputs a mental evaluation and a selection or focussing of a
course of action, and that this resource can be divided between tasks.
Additional supporting evidence comes from the studies of the effect of
the conscious process upon the storage of information in short-term memory.
According to the physics-based theory, the conscious process merely actu-
alizes a course of action, which then develops automatically, with perhaps
some occasional monitoring. Thus if one sets in place the activity of retain-
ing in memory a certain sequence of stimuli, then this activity can persist
undiminished while the central processor is engaged in another task. This is
what the data indicate.
Pashler remarks that ”These conclusions contradict the remarkably widespread
assumption that short-term memory capacity can be equated with, or used
as a measure of, central resources.”[p.341] In the theory outlined here short-
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term memory is stored in patterns of brain activity, whereas consciousness is
associated with the selection of a subensemble of quasi-classical states. This
distinction seems to account for the large amount of detailed data that bears
on this question of the connection of short-term-memory to consciousness.
[p.337-341]
Deliberate storage in, or retrieval from, long-term memory requires fo-
cussed attention, and hence conscious effort. These processes should, ac-
cording to the theory, use part of the limited processing capacity, and hence
be detrimentally affected by a competing task that makes sufficient concur-
rent demands on the central resources. On the other hand, “perceptual”
processing that involves conceptual categorization and identification without
conscious awareness should not interfer with tasks that do consume central
processing capacity. These expectations are what the evidence appears to
confirm: “the entirety of...front-end processing are modality specific and op-
erate independent of the sort of single-channel central processing that limits
retrieval and the control of action. This includes not only perceptual analysis
but also storasge in STM (short term memory) and whatever may feed back
to change the allocation of perceptual attention itself.” [p. 353]
Pashler describes a result dating from the nineteenth century: mental ex-
ertion reduces the amount of physical force that a person can apply. He notes
that “This puzzling phenomena remains unexplained.” [p. 387]. However,
it is an automatic consequence of the physics-based theory: creating physi-
cal force by muscle contraction requires an effort that opposes the physical
tendencies generated by the Schroedinger equation. This opposing tendency
is produced by the quantum Zeno effect, and is roughly proportional to the
number of bits per second of central processing capacity that is devoted to
the task. So if part of this processing capacity is directed to another task,
then the applied force will diminish.
Pashler speculates on the possibility of a neurophysiological explanation
of the facts he describes, but notes that the parallel versus serial distinction
between the two mechanisms leads, in the classical neurophysiological ap-
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proach, to the questions of what makes these two mechanisms so different,
and what the connection between them is. [p.354-6, 386-7]
After analyzing various possible mechanisms that could cause the central
bottleneck, Pashler [p.307-8] says “the question of why this should be the case
is quite puzzling.” Thus the fact that this bottleneck, and its basic properties,
follow automatically from the same laws that explain the complex empirical
evidence in the fields of classical and quantum physics means that the theory
has significant explanatory power.
Of course, some similar sort of structure could presumably be worked into
a classical model. But a general theory of all of nature that automatically
explains a lot of empirical data in a particular field on the basis of the general
principles is normally judge superior to a special theory that is rigged after
the fact to explain these data.
It needs to be emphasized that there is at present absolutely no empirical
evidence that favors the classical model over the quantum model described
above. The classical model would have to be implemented as a statistical
theory, due to the uncertainties in the initial conditions, and that statistical
model is to first order the same as the simple quantum model described
above. The quantum model has the advantage that at least it could be
valid, whereas the classical model must necessarily fail when quantum effects
become important. So nothing is lost by switching to quantum theory, but
a lot is gained. Psychology and psychiatry gain the possibility of reconciling
with neuroscience the essential psychological concept of the ability of our
minds to guide our actions. And psycho-physics gains a dynamical model for
the interaction of mind and brain. Finally, philosophy of mind is liberated
from the dilemma of having to choosing between “identity theory” and the
“emergence” of a causally inert mind: the emergence a mind which lacks the
capacity to act back on the physical world in the way needed to drive its
evolution hand-in-hand with the evolution of the brain.
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